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Book Reviews

l.F. Stone, The Trial of Socrates. Boston: Little, Brown, 1988.

I. F. Stone died after I had written this review but before
I could ask for his response to it. While I am sadly aware
of that missed opportunity, I know that, with many of
you, I have been the beneficiary of his thoughtful
responses through my adult life. I am grateful for the
opportunity to acknowledge that debt.

This readable and provocative book invites
us to have another look at Plato and Xenophon, at Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and
Aristophanes, and, not least, at Thucydides,
all of whom are called forth as witnesses at
a reconvened trial of Socrates. Stone's
reminders of what these witnesses have to
offer are thoughtful and evocative. They led
me, and I believe might lead many of you, to
wonder about what academic life would be
like if we had all once seriously read this literature. How much could such a sense of shared
cultural continuity empower us and enable us
to help each other and our students? What
would a society be like in which such a cultural investment was general?
I spoke of having "another" look at the classical literature in my first sentence, but I know
that it would be a first look for many of us,
even here in a university, with our Ph.Ds and
our academic commitments. I know that one
of the lessons most students learn in school,
if they have encountered classical Greece at
all, is that its literature is esoteric stuff- the
kind of thing they have no need to know. I
know also that many of us, students and
faculty, who have not made the classical
canon our own, will define investment in it
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as an elitist conceit. To some extent it is that.
Nonetheless, I suspect that no one can teach
us to puncture the sort of self-protective armor
that suggests that is all it is better than
Socrates. He was hard on self-deception, on
confusing the appearance of knowledge with
the thing itself, on a preoccupation with the
uses to which learning might be put, on those
who did not recognize that learning was also
an important kind of prayer, in which we
both celebrated and gave thanks for our gifts.
If I am not mistaken, his admonitions would
be well placed among us.
Stone, who decided to make the commitment to learning ancient Greek and to
immersing himself in the classical literature
after a long and heroic career as a political
journalist, and who published this book after
his eightieth birthday, makes us feel a little
ashamed of our failures to have done much
with this core of our own general education.
That seems to me not the least of the book's
strengths. The relevant Greek word is, I think,
Aidos, connoting the basic virtue of being
capable of a sense of shame. It is something
many of us, and I am afraid I would in this
instance include Stone, could do with more
of.
Stone professes to admire Socrates, but he
is clearly much less than altogether pleased
with him. My sense is that Socrates might be
similarly uncomfortable were he to review
Stone's book - that Socrates would be particularly uncomfortable with what I believe he
would regard as Stone's willingness to sacrifice truth to political ideology. He would, I
fear, have to remind Stone that democratic
ideology has no special exemptions from the
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requirement that we pursue truth as assiduously as we can, and that he, Socrates, in saying this, was not being antidemocratic.
Socrates, as Stone points out, is wary of Athenian democracy, but he has more compelling
reasons for this wariness than the pro-Spartan
monarchist views Stone assigns to him.
William Arrowsmith in the Introduction to
his translation of Aristophanes' The Clouds
suggests that one of the key phenomena of late
Golden Age Greece was its divorce from its
roots. Spartan control of the countryside had
urbanized the state and the quick wealth
associated with the empire had subverted the
steady substructure of earlier times. Arrowsmith sees the decadence of the young men
who study with Socrates as a function of these
forces - much larger forces than anything
Socrates could have been responsible for.
Forde sees the same decadence as a function
of the openly immoral quest for empire
Athens embarked on under Pericles, and continued in its struggle with Sparta. Kitto sees
it as the steady penetration of the wholeness
of the polis by the narrow instrumental values
of specialists - a central tenet of Socrates'
own quarrel with the Sophists. These are
themes Stone, I expect, would appreciate, and
ones he should have known about. My reservations about what Stone has accomplished
have a good deal to do with how I interpret
his silence on these points. In order to speak
to it Stone would have had to acknowledge
that a good deal of the decadence Arrowsmith
identifies was reflected in the democracy that
Stone champions. That Socrates distances
himself from that d'emocracy, which is one of
Stone's chief charges against him, would then
be explicable in terms other than the fondness for an autocratic monarchism Stone
alleges. I am sympathetic to Socrates' apolitical stance. I am reminded of that whenever
political people like Stone manifest an unquestioning conviction that all things ultimately

have to be assessed in terms of their political
consequences - particularly reminded of it
when I sense, as I do in Stone's book, the
urgency of the effort to politicize my point of
view. Stone's fervor here is single-minded
enough for him to fail to recognize Socrates'
sardonic humor when he tells the Assembly
that the "young men of the richer classes who
study with him are those who have nothing
better to do." How, one might ask, can Stone
take this remark at face value when Socrates
suggests, later in the same speech, that
"examining myself and others, is the greatest
good of man ... that the unexamined life is not
worth living... "? How can he take the implied
cavalier dilletantism seriously when Socrates
in that same dialogue names the rich young
men who are present, and who clearly cared
so much about the outcome of the trial? One
has to suspect that the opportunity to reduce
their experience to a sort of distraction of
overly privileged and idle youth tempted
Stone more than it should have.
Stone's willingness to sacrifice what he
knows for what he believes he must stand for
is evident in other places. He has a marvelous
chapter on freedom of speech in Athens, but
he also devotes a chapter to stories Socrates
could have used from earlier Greek poets that
had anti-democratic themes. The evidence
presented by Stone, who is the recipient of
a Medal of Liberty from the American Civil
Liberties Union and should know better, is
terribly thin. In the end we do not know that
Socrates actually used such stories or even
that he was accused of using them. We know
only that Xenophon did not deny that he
used them and that if Stone were Xenophon
and Socrates had not used them, Stone would
have made that explicit.
There are a number of what seem to me to
be striking examples of this sort of thing.
Stone's view of Socrates, for one, is largely
drawn from Plato, and Plato, Stone certainly
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knew very well, had ample reason to distrust
the democracy that had executed his mentor.
Nowhere is this simple fact affirmed. Instead
Stone draws on the Platonic literature, not as
if it were a byproduct of the execution of
Socrates, which is its central pivot, but instead
as if it were a cause of that terrible verdict.
If sophistry is twisting the information one has
in order to justify an a priori conclusion, it
may well be Stone rather than Socrates who
provides the clearer case in point.
It is also worth noting that Socrates is identified as a prototypical Sophist by
Aristophanes twenty-five years before he is
brought before the Assembly, not irrelevantly
in a drama explicitly designed to win a prize
based on popular approval. Aristophanes'
broad strokes are directed at the otherworldly
craziness of academic life - and at its
irrelevance to anything practical, except perhaps the continuing income of its practitioners. It is as anti-Sophist (and
anti-professorial) a play as one can easily
imagine, and it is produced in the midst of
the Peloponnesian Wars, but there is no suggestion that anyone is in secret league with
Sparta, or that an anti-democratic animus
informs the philosopher's other-worldliness.
Stone, who says some very interesting things
about Aristophanes, fails to note this omission, and it is hard for me to assume that his
failure to do that is unconnected to the case
Stone wants to make.
Stone compellingly points out that Plato's
dialogues, despite their nominal rejection of
Sophism, have a goodly measure of Sophistic
qualities. In this too, Stone sees underlying
political dynamics. It is not Plato's reaction
to Heraclitus (which Stone mentions only
once) that is responsible for the rigidity of the
theory of Forms and some terribly sterile arguments about what is true. The sterility of these
dialogues is instead attributed to a withdrawal
from democratic politics masked as an apolit-
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ical otherworldliness. Socrates' preference for
rule by "those who know" is not seen as a
commitment to the quest for wisdom and to
that government which will support such a
quest, but as a veiled way of expressing his
secret belief in monarchy. Antiphon's belief
in the inequality of wealth as the chief source
of civic dissension, and his belief in the consent of the governed as the basis of the polis,
like Alcidamus' opposition to any natural law
justifications for slavery, are presented as part
of an implicit indictment. Stone, after noting
the uniqueness of each of their positions in
Athenian thought, goes on to ask rhetorically
why neither Socrates nor Plato thought the
same thing. Even if we allow the question, an
answer that does not take into account the
senses in which Plato's politics must have been
a reaction, albeit a modest one, to the execution of Socrates by the Athenian Assembly,
seems clearly inadequate. I can only understand Stone's position as an expression of his
unwillingness to see Plato and his peers as victims of the democracy. That would put Stone
on a side of an argument where he does not
wish to go.
Political virtue, defined as holding forth on
the side of "the people" and the Assembly,
not truth, seems to be Stone's bottom line.
I heard "What side are you on?" when I read
the arguments I have been recounting. Do
you know the song? "In Harlan County," it
goes, "you either are a union man or a scab
for ].H. Blair. There are no neutrals there."
Stone doesn't seem to want to allow any in
Athens either. The democracy is beautiful,
fragile, and at war with the antidemocratic
(and antiphilosophic) Spartans, and from time
to time with the even worse Persians, on the
outside, while it is being subverted by internal oligarchs like Socrates and his students
internally. An explicit reference is made to
Franco's famous phrase about his fifth column
inside Madrid. The lessons Stone learned
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from the Spanish Civil War and from hard
times in Eastern Kentucky seem to simplify
things for him a good deal.
Alcibiades, who was nothing if he was not
complex, offers an interesting example of this
proclivity to simplify. Alcibiades studied
under Socrates as a teenager and knew him
until his death at forty-six. He was by all
accounts, beautiful, courageous, brilliant, and
charismatic. He and Socrates were comrades
in arms twice, each having had occasion to
save the other's life. Alcibiades convincingly
claims to admire Socrates above all men,
though he has refused to act on his teaching
all of his adult life. Alcibiades, who Xenophon
suggests "was hunted by many on account of
his beauty," is unable to seduce Socrates claiming that his chance to do so would be
about equal to his chance to defeat Ajax in
hand-to-hand combat. Alcibiades, according
to Thucydides, who certainly does not
approve of him, is unquestionably the most
successful Greek general of the Golden Age .
He is interesting, complicated, and distressingly modern. At various times in his incredibly mercurial career, he is a champion of
Samian democracy, a popular democratic
leader, an agent of the Persian Satrap, an
organizer of oligarchic revolts against both the
Athenian and the Argive democracies, and
the last great hope of the Athenian
Democracy, which he almost rescues from
what looked like certain defeat after earlier
both betraying it and being betrayed by it.
He is an enemy of the repressive Athenian
oligarchies of 411 and 404, the latter of which
is responsible for his death. Stone, however,
needs him only to be on the side to which
he is assigned, "a Sparta-loving Athenian,"
and that is all we get.
Alcibiades is presented as a disciple who followed through on the path Socrates had, perhaps unwittingly, laid out for him. Plato's
representation of Alcibiades in the Sympo-

sium sees his relationship with Socrates differently. Socrates, he suggests " ... makes me admit
that while I'm spending my time on politics
I am neglecting all the things that are crying
for attention in myself. So I just refuse to listen to him - as if he were one of those Sirens
you know, ... Socrates is the only man in the
world who can make me feel ashamed .. .!
know I ought to do the things he tells me to,
and yet the moment I'm out of his sight I
don't care what I do to keep in with the mob.
So I dash off like a runaway slave ... ". "Things
that are crying for attention in one's self' are
reduced to elitist detachment for Stone, and
like Alcibiades, he "dashes off from them like
a runaway slave" - only in Stone's case, he
does not seem to know he is running.
Alcibiades is said by Stone to have " ... won
the hearts of his Spartan hosts by giving up
his elegant Athenian manners, and adopting
the Spartan mode of life." Plutarch's Life of
Alcibiades is cited to the effect that "When
they [the Spartans] saw him with his hair
untrimmed, taking cold baths, on terms of
intimacy with their coarse bread and supping
black porridge they could hardly believe their
eyes .. .ln Sparta, he was all for bodily training, simplicity of life and severity of countenance." In the next sentence Stone builds
his case by speaking more generally of the
"Sparta-loving Athenians" of whom Alcibiades is said to be an example. The rest of
Plutarch's description, which Stone does not
give us, suggests that "he [Alcibiades]
could ... change faster than a chameleon ... At
Sparta, he was devoted to athletic exercises,
was frugal and reserved; in Ionia, luxurious,
gay, and indolent; in Thrace, always drinking; in Thessaly, ever on horseback; and when
he lived with Tisaphernes, the Persian satrap,
he exceeded the Persians themselves in magnificence and pomp." Alcibiades is terribly
ambitious. He can reduce public issues to the
private scores he wishes to settle, and then
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proceed to settle them with great ruthlessness.
He does not seem to allow the public consequences of these actions to come to mind anymore than he allows himself encounters with
"the one man who can make me feel
ashamed." He was orphaned early and
brought up in Pericles' household without any
close family contact at all. He flees those who
are close to him all of his life. One is tempted
to think of him in clinical terms. When Stone
suggests him as the test of the Socratic tie
between knowledge and virtue (" ... if virtue is
knowledge, as Socrates taught, then ... Alcibiades should have been preeminently virtuous ... "), it is hard for me to imagine that he
does not know that he is distorting the
Socratic positon. He allows himself to do it,
I believe, because he, unlike Socrates or
Alcibiades, is on the right side.
I have dwelt on what seem to me to be the
book's weaknesses. It is passionate, powerful,
and full of interesting insights too. I found
Stone's discussion of Greek theatre, like his
discussion of free speech, quite wonderful something it may well be useful to share with
students. Stone's discussion of the dialectic
was similarly instructive, though he gives less
credence to the value of a quest for ideals than
I would. His discussion of the polis is lovely
and in its emphasis on the centricity of logos
- good rational conversation valued as an
end in itself- might well be something many
of us could think about more when we considered our roles as teachers and colleagues.
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Primo Levi, Other People's Trades. Translated
by Raymond Rosenthal. New York: Summit
Books, 1989. 222 pages.

_ _ _ _ , The Dmwned and the Saved.
Translated by Raymond Rosenthal. New York:
Summit Books, 1988. 203 pages.
Primo Levi's apparent suicide in 1987
shocked the literary world. Best known for his
Survival in Auschwitz (1947), a recounting of the
unspeakable brutalities he experienced in the
Buna Lager at Auschwitz, Levi wrote eight
books in all: The Reawakening (1965), The Periodic Table (1975), The Monkey's Wrench (1978),
Moments of Reprieve (1981), If Not Now, When?
(1982), and the two of this review. Each in
some way touched on events of the Holocaust,
some in memoir, some in fiction.
At his death, Levi left no explanation, no
statement. Some attributed the suicide to failing health; he was 68. Others pointed to Levi's
comment on the suicide of Jean Amry, also
a victim of the Nazi concentration camps:
"Anyone who has been tortured, remains tortured." Whatever the reason, and it is doubtful we will ever know, Levi's last two books
will remain a tribute to his engaging mind and
moral vision.
Though Other People's Trades is Levi's last
published work in America, it first appeared
in Italy in 1985. For my purposes its earlier
publication date makes it a good starting point
in examining Levi's wonderfully fertile mind.
Readers who do not know Levi may be surprised to learn he was an organic chemist, who
spent his professional life managing a paint factory in Turin. Indeed, his education in chemistry is one of the accidents of fate which
contributed to his survival in Auschwitz, where
he "worked" on the Nazi's ill-fated efforts to
produce synthetic rubber.
In Other People's Trades, Levi's boundless
curiosity and scientific training combine to produce some of the most engaging personal essays
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